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Free-space channels provide the possibility of establishing continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-
QKD) in global communication networks. However, the fluctuating nature of transmissivity in these channels in-
troduces an extra noise which reduces the achievable secret key rate. We consider two classical post-processing
strategies, post-selection of high-transmissivity data and data clusterization, to reduce the fluctuation-induced
noise of the channel. We undertake the first investigation of such strategies utilising a composable security
proof in a realistic finite-size regime against both collective and individual attacks. We also present an efficient
parameter estimation approach to estimate the effective Gaussian parameters over the post-selected data or the
clustered data. Although the composable finite-size effects become more significant with the post-selection and
clusterization both reducing the size of the data, our results show that these strategies are still able to enhance
the finite-size key rate against both individual and collective attacks with a remarkable improvement against col-
lective attacks–even moving the protocol from an insecure regime to a secure regime under certain conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] allows two trusted
parties (traditionally called Alice and Bob) to share a secret
key which is unknown to a potential eavesdropper (tradition-
ally called Eve) by using quantum communication over an in-
secure quantum channel and classical communication over an
authenticated classical channel. QKD systems were first pro-
posed for discrete-variable quantum systems [4, 5], where the
key information is encoded onto the degrees of freedom of sin-
gle photons, and the detection is realized by single-photon de-
tectors, and then extended for continuous-variable (CV) quan-
tum systems [6–8], where the key information is encoded onto
the amplitude and phase quadratures of the quantized electro-
magnetic field of light, and detection is realised by (faster and
more efficient) homodyne or heterodyne detectors. CV-QKD
systems (see [2, 9–11] for review) have the potential of achiev-
ing higher secret key rates, as well as the advantage of com-
patibility with current telecommunication optical networks.
CV-QKD systems have experimentally been demonstrated
over optical fibres [13–17], however the maximum secure
transmission distance is still limited to few hundred kilome-
tres. As an alternative, free-space channels have the poten-
tial to extend the maximum transmission range of CV-QKD
systems [18, 19] as thay provide a possibility for the imple-
mentation of satellite-based QKD systems [20, 21]. How-
ever, in free-space channels (in contrast to optical fibers) the
channel suffers from atmospheric turbulence (causing beam-
wandering, beam shape deformation, beam broadening, etc.),
which results in a random variation of channel transmissiv-
ity in time. This fluctuation effect can be characterized by
a probability distribution of the channel transmissivity. De-
pending on the atmospheric effects, advanced probability dis-
tribution models have been proposed for the channel trans-
missivity [22–26], which accurately describe free-space ex-
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periments [27, 28].
A free-space channel can be considered as a set of sub-
channels, where the transmissivity of the channel is relatively
stable for each sub-channel [27]. In a Gaussian CV-QKD pro-
tocol [9, 10], Alice prepares Gaussian quantum states, which
are modulated with a Gaussian distribution. Once these Gaus-
sian states are transmited over a free-space channel to Bob,
the fluctuating transmissivity of the channel makes the re-
ceived state (at Bob’s station) a non-Gaussian mixture of the
Gaussian states obtained for each sub-channel [29]. This non-
Gaussian effect introduces an extra noise, which reduces the
key rate [27, 30, 31], however, the fluctuating transmissivity
also provides a possibility to recover the key rate through the
post-selection of data from sub-channels with high transmis-
sivity [27]. The post-selection decreases the amount of chan-
nel fluctuation (i.e., decreases the variance of the transmissity
distribution), which leads to a post-selected state with a more
Gaussian nature (i.e., with less non-Gaussian noise). This
post-selection has been shown to be effective for CV-QKD
protocols in the asymptotic regime [27, 30] against Gaus-
sian collective attacks1. The other classical post-processing
strategy which can also reduce the negative effect of the
fluctuation-induced noise is to partition the recorded data into
different clusters [33], and analyse the security for each clus-
ter separately. Although these strategies are both effective
in reducing the fluctuation-induced noise, they also reduce
the size of the effective data set used for the security analy-
sis. Hence, since in practice a finite number of signals are
exchanged between Alice and Bob, the composable finite-
size issues become even more significant when either post-
selection or clusterisation is applied. Thus, whether these
classical post-processing strategies are still effective in a com-
1 Note that the post-selection of transmission bins with high value has also
been shown effective for enhancing the squeezing properties of light trans-
mitted through the turbulent atmosphere [24, 28], and improving the fi-
delity of the coherent-state teleportation over the turbulent atmosphere
[32].
2posable finite-size regime remains an open question.
We consider the no-switching [34, 35] CV-QKD protocol
(based on Gaussian-modulated coherent states and heterodyne
detection) over a free-space channel. For the channel proba-
bility distribution we consider the elliptic-beam model [24],
which accounts for the deflection and deformation of a Gaus-
sian beam caused by turbulence in atmospheric channels. We
analyse the composable finite-size security of the protocol by
using the recent security proof, stating that according to the
Gaussian de Finetti reduction, for the no-switching protocol
it is sufficient to consider Gaussian collective attacks in the
finite-size, composable security proof [36, 37]. We answer the
question whether the post-selection of high-tranmissivity sub-
channels and data clusterisation can improve the performance
of the free-space CV-QKD system in a composable finite-size
regime against both collective and individual attacks2.
For both post-selection and clusterisation, the sub-channel
transmissivity has to be estimated by publicly revealing a
randomly-chosen subset of the data obtained over the stability
time. There are other proposed methods [39–41], which uti-
lize classical auxiliary probes or the local oscillator to estimate
the sub-channel transmissivity. However, since these classical
signals could be likely manipulated by Eve, the classical esti-
mation of the channel may compromise the security. Note that
in principle the parameters of the channel, i.e., transmissivity
and excess noise, can be estimated for each sub-channel real-
ization separately, however, in practice only a small number of
signals can be transmitted over the stability time of the chan-
nel, which results in pessimistic error bars for the estimated
parameters, which consequently overestimates Eve’s informa-
tion, and leads to a pessimistic bound for key rate. Hence, to
estimate Eve’s information, instead of estimating the parame-
ters of each sub-channel, we utilize the data revealed over all
sub-channels (which are used for the security analysis) to esti-
mate the effective Gaussian parameters. Our security analysis
shows that the optimised post-selection can improve the finite-
size key rate against both individual and collective attacks.
Our previous work on Gaussian post-selection [42] showed
a relatively modest improvement in the finite-size collective
attacks in comparison with the significant improvement pre-
dicted by an asymptotic analysis. Surprisingly, our present
work shows that the post-selection of high-transmissivity sub-
channels provides a significant improvement in the compos-
able finite-size regime, comparable to that predicted asymp-
totically. Further, we show that the data clusterisation can also
significantly improve the composable finite key rates against
collective attacks, provided an optimal clusterisation of sub-
channels are chosen.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In
Sec. II, the no-switching CV-QKD system is described, with
the security discussed in the composable finite-size regime.
In Sec. III, the CV-QKD system over free-space channels is
discussed, with the security analysed using two approaches
2 Note that when Eve has a restricted quantum memory, individual attacks
can become the optimal eavesdropping attacks for the no-switching CV-
QKD protocol [38].
in the composable finite-size regime by introducing an effi-
cient parameter estimation approach. In Sec. IV, the finite-
size composable security is analysed for the system with post-
selection of high-transmissivity sub-channels and for the sys-
tem with data clusterisation, and the significant improvement
of the composable finite key rates against collective attacks us-
ing these strategies is illustrated. Finally, concluding remarks
are provided in Sec. V.
II. SYSTEMMODEL
We consider a Gaussian no-switching CV-QKD protocol
[34, 35], where Alice prepares Gaussian modulated coherent
states and Bob uses heterodyne detection. In a prepare-and-
measure scheme Alice generates two random real variables,
(aq, ap), drawn from two independent Gaussian distributions
of variance VA. Alice prepares coherent states by modulating
a coherent laser source by amounts of (aq, ap). The variance
of the beam after the modulator is VA+1 = V (where the 1 is
for the shot noise variance), hence an average output state is
thermal of variance V . The prepared coherent states are trans-
mitted over an insecure quantum channel to Bob. For each
incoming state, Bob uses heterodyne detection and measures
both the qˆ and pˆ quadratures to obtain (bq, bp). In this proto-
col, sifting is not needed, since both of the random variables
generated by Alice are used for the key generation. When
all the incoming quantum states have been measured by Bob,
classical post-processing (including discretization, parameter
estimation, error correction, and privacy amplification) over
a public but authenticated classical channel is commenced to
produce a shared secret key.
The prepare-and-measure scheme can be represented by an
equivalent entanglement-based scheme [9, 10], where Alice
generates a pure two-mode squeezed vacuum state with the
quadrature variance V . Alice keeps one mode, while sending
the second mode to Bob over the insecure quantum channel.
When Alice applies a heterodyne detection to her mode, she
projects the other mode onto a coherent state. At the output
of the channel, Bob applies a heterodyne detection to the re-
ceived mode.
A. Composable Finite-size security analysis
In the asymptotic regime collective attacks are as powerful
as coherent attacks [43], and for Gaussian protocols, Gaussian
collective attacks are asymptotically optimal [44–46]. Note
also that for Gaussian protocols, among individual attacks,
Gaussian individual attacks are asymptotically optimal [9].
In the finite-size regime, the no-switching CV-QKD proto-
col with N coherent states sent by Alice to Bob is ǫ-secure
against Gaussian collective attacks in a reverse reconcilia-
tion scenario if ǫ=2ǫsm+ǫ¯+ǫPE+ǫcor [47, 48] and if the key
length ℓ is chosen such that [47, 48]
ℓ≤N ′[βI(a:b)−χǫPE(b:E)]−√N ′∆AEP−2 log2( 12ǫ¯ ), (1)
3where [47, 48]
∆AEP = (d+1)
2+4(d+1)
√
log2(2/ǫ
2
sm)+
2 log2(2/(ǫ
2ǫsm))+4ǫsmd/(ǫ
√
N ′),
(2)
whereN ′ = N−k, with k the number of data points Alice and
Bob are required to disclose during the parameter estimation,
d is the discretization parameter (i.e., each symbol is encoded
with d bits of precision), ǫsm is the smoothing parameter, ǫcor
and ǫPE are the maximum failure probabilities for the error
correction and parameter estimation, respectively, and I(a:b)
is the classical mutual information shared between Alice and
Bob, and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the reconciliation efficiency. Note
that in the finite-size regime the usual χ(b:E) (the maximum
mutual information shared between Eve and Bob limited by
the Holevo bound for the collective attack) has to be replaced
by χǫPE(b:E), taking into account the finite precision of the
parameter estimation. In fact, it is now assumed that Eve’s
information is upper bounded by χǫPE(b:E), except with the
probability ǫPE. The final key rate is then given by ℓ/N .
Note that for the ǫ-security analysis of the same protocol
against Gaussian individual attacks we can still use Eq. (1),
where χǫPE(b:E) must be replaced by the classical mutual in-
formation between Eve and Bob, maximised by IǫPE(b:E) ex-
cept with the probability ǫPE.
Note also that based on the recent security proof in [36, 37],
for analysing the composable finite-size security of the no-
switching CV-QKD protocol against general attacks, the se-
curity of the protocol can be first analysed against Gaussian
collective attacks with a security parameter ǫ [47] through the
use of Eq. (1), and then, by using the Gaussian de Finetti re-
duction [36], the security can be obtained against general at-
tacks with a polynomially larger security parameter ǫ˜ [36].
Note that the security loss due to the reduction from general
attacks to Gaussian collective attacks scales like O(N4) [36].
More precisely, according to [36], ǫ-security against Gaussian
collective attacks implies ǫ˜-security against general attacks,
with ǫ˜/ǫ = O(N4).
III. FREE-SPACE CV-QKD SYSTEMS
In free-space channels the atmospheric effects will cause
the transmitted beam to experience fading. Hence, in contrast
to a fiber link with a fixed transmissivity, the transmissivity, η,
of a free-space channel fluctuates in time. Such fading chan-
nels can be characterized by a probability distribution p(η)
[27, 49]. In fact, a fading channel can be decomposed into
a set of sub-channels. Each sub-channel ηi is defined as the
set of events, for which the transmissivity is relatively stable,
meaning that the fluctuations of the transmissivity is negligi-
ble. Each sub-channel ηi occurs with probability pi so that∑
i
pi = 1 or
∫ ηmax
0 p(η)dη = 1 for a continuous probability
distribution, where ηmax is the maximum realizable value of
transmissivity of the fading channel. Thus, the Wigner func-
tion of the output state is the sum of the Wigner functions of
the states after sub-channels weighted by sub-channel prob-
abilities [49]. Hence, the input Gaussian state ρin remains
Gaussian after passing through each sub-channel, however,
the resulting state at the output of the channel, ρout =
∑
i
piρi,
(with ρi the Gaussian state resulted from the transmission of
the input Gaussian state ρin through the sub-channel ηi) is a
non-Gaussian state [49].
In the equivalent entanglement-based scheme of the no-
switching CV-QKD protocol, the initial pure two-mode Gaus-
sian entangled state ρAB0 with the quadrature variance V is
completely described by its first moment, which is zero, and
its covariance matrix,
MAB0 =
[
V I
√
V 2 − 1Z√
V 2 − 1Z V I
]
. (3)
Alice keeps mode A and sends mode B0 through an insecure
free-space channel. After transmission of mode B0 through a
quantum sub-channel with transmissivity η and excess noise
ξη (relative to the input of the sub-channel with transmissivity
η), the covariance matrix of the Gaussian state ρAB1,η at the
output of the sub-channel is given by
MAB1,η =
[
V I
√
η
√
V 2 − 1Z√
η
√
V 2 − 1Z [η(V − 1) + ηξη + 1] I
]
.
(4)
Since the ensemble-average state at the output of a free-space
channel, ρAB1 , is a non-Gaussian mixture of Gaussian states
obtained from individual sub-channels, the elements of the co-
variance matrix of the ensemble-average state ρAB1 are given
by the convex sum of the moments given by Eq. (4). Hence,
the covariance matrix of the non-Gaussian ensemble-average
state ρAB1 at the output of the free-space channel is given by
MAB1=
[
V I
〈√
η
〉√
V 2 − 1Z〈√
η
〉 √
V 2 − 1Z [〈η〉 (V − 1) + 〈ηξη〉+ 1] I
]
.
(5)
where the symbol 〈.〉 denotes the mean value over the sub-
channels (or over all possible values of η), i.e.,
〈η〉 = ∫ ηmax0 ηp(η)dη, 〈√η〉 = ∫ ηmax0 √ηp(η)dη,
〈ηξη〉 =
∫ ηmax
0
ηξηp(η)dη.
(6)
Note that unlike the previous theoretical works on free-space
CV-QKD [27, 30, 31, 50–53] with the assumption of fixed
excess noise, here we have assumed the channel excess noise
can also randomly vary in time, where the value of the excess
noise depends on the the value of the channel transmissivity.
From the covariance matrix of the non-Gaussian ensemble-
average state in Eq. (5), it is evident that the fluctuating chan-
nel can be considered as a non-fluctuating channel with the
effective transmissivity ηf and effective excess noise ξf , so
that the covariance matrix of the ensemble-average state can
4be rewritten as
MAB1=
[
V I
√
ηf
√
V 2 − 1Z√
ηf
√
V 2 − 1Z [ηf (V−1)+ηf ξf+1] I
]
,with
ηf =
〈√
η
〉2
,
ηfξf = Var(
√
η)(V − 1) + 〈ηξη〉, and where
Var(
√
η) = 〈η〉 − 〈√η〉2.
(7)
According to Eq. (7), the extra non-Gaussian noise, caused by
the fluctuating nature of the channel, depends on the variance
of the transmissivity fluctuations, Var(
√
η), and the modula-
tion variance, VA = V − 1.
IV. COMPOSABLE FINITE-SIZE SECURITY ANALYSIS
FOR FREE-SPACE CV-QKD SYTEMS
Here we analyse the composable finite-size security of the
no-switching CV-QKD protocol implemented over free-space
channels using two approaches, first by analysing the security
over all data, and second by analysing the security for each
sub-channel separately. We also analyse the security against
both general attacks (i.e., memory-assisted attacks) and indi-
vidual attacks (i.e., non-memory attacks).
A. Security analysis over all data
1. General attacks
Based on the leftover hash lemma [54, 55], the num-
ber of approximately secure bits, ℓ, that can be extracted
from the raw key should be slightly smaller than the smooth
min-entropy of Bob’s string b conditioned on Eve’s sys-
tem E′ (which characterizes Eve’s quantum state E, as well
as the public classical variable C leaked during the QKD
protocol), denoted by Hǫsmmin(b|E′) [54], i.e., we have ℓ ≤
N ′Hǫsmmin(b|E′)−2 log2( 12ǫ¯ ), where ǫ¯ comes from the leftover
hash lemma. Note thatN ′ indicates the length of Bob’s string
b after the parameter estimation. The chain rule for the smooth
min-entropy [47] gives N ′Hǫsmmin(b|E′) = N ′Hǫsmmin(b|EC) ≥
N ′Hǫsmmin(b|E) − log2 |C|, where log2 |C| = lEC, with lEC
the size of data leakage during the error correction. Note
that the leakage during the error correction can be given
by lEC = N
′[H(b) − βI(a:b)] [47, 48, 56], where H(b)
is Bob’s Shannon entropy. In order to calculate the length
ℓ of the final key which is ǫ-secure (ǫ=2ǫsm+ǫ¯+ǫPE+ǫcor
[47, 48]), the conditional smooth min-entropyHǫsmmin(b|E) has
to be lower bounded when the protocol did not abort. Un-
der the assumption of independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d) attacks such as collective or individual attacks, where
every signal transmitted is attacked with the same quantum
operation, the asymptotic equipartition property [47, 57, 58]
can be utilized to lower bound the conditional smooth min-
entropy with the conditional von Neumann entropy. Explic-
itly, we have N ′Hǫsmmin(b |E ) ≥ N ′S(b |E ) −
√
N ′∆AEP
[47, 48], where S(b |E) is the conditional von Neumann en-
tropy. The conditional von Neumann entropy S(b |E) is given
by S(b|E) = H(b)−HǫPE(b:E), where Eve’s information on
Bob’s string b is upper bounded by HǫPE(b:E), except with
probability ǫPE for a given attack (for collective attacks we
have HǫPE(b:E) = χǫPE(b:E) and for individual attacks we
haveHǫPE(b:E) = IǫPE(b:E)).
In our finite-size security analysis the assumption of col-
lective attacks to lower bound the conditional smooth min-
entropy comes with no loss of generality because based on
the Gaussian de Finetti reduction, for the security analysis of
the no-switching protocol against general attacks, it is suffi-
cient to consider Gaussian collective attacks in the compos-
able finite-size security proof [36, 37].
Since the covariance matrix of the non-Gaussian ensemble-
average state resulting from a free-space channel, given by
Eq. (7), can be described by the effective parameters ηf and
ξf , for the security analysis we can consider an optimal Gaus-
sian collective attack with parameters ηf and ξf . In this op-
timal attack Eve interacts individually with each transmitted
signal through an optimal entangling cloner attack [59] with
the effective parameters ηf and ξf , with her output ancillae
stored in her quantum memory to be collectively measured
later. Since this attack is i.i.d over all sub-channels, the condi-
tional smooth min-entropy can be lower bounded by the con-
ditional von Neumann entropy. Thus the total finite-size key
rate with the security parameter ǫ against Gaussian collective
attacks is given by
KFScol =
1
N
[
N ′[βI(a:b)−χǫPE(b:E)]−
√
N ′∆AEP−2 log2(
1
2ǫ¯
)
]
.
(8)
Note that we assume Ns is the number of signals transmit-
ted over each sub-channel, from which ks signals are re-
vealed for the parameter estimation and N ′s = Ns − ks sig-
nals are used for the key generation. In total, a number of
N signal states are transmitted, from which k signals are re-
vealed over all sub-channels for the parameter estimation and
N ′ = N − k signals are used for the key generation. Note
that in Eq. (8), I(a:b) is calculated based on the effective pa-
rameters ηf and ξf , and Eve’s information from collective at-
tack, χǫPE(b:E), is calculated based on the covariance matrix
of the ensemble-average state, which can be estimated based
on a relatively large number of signals k (where k ≫ ks) re-
vealed over all sub-channels (see Sec. IVC). Note that accord-
ing to [36], for the no-switching protocol, ǫ-security against
collective attacks implies ǫ˜-security against general attacks,
with ǫ˜/ǫ = O(N ′4).
2. Individual attacks
Considering the fact that in reality Eve has access to a re-
stricted quantum memory with limited coherence time, where
each state stored into her quantummeory undergoes a specific
amount of decoherence over the storage time, individual at-
tacks might be more beneficial for Eve than collective attacks
5[38]. In terms of the interaction with the transmitted signals,
an individual attack is the same as a collective attack, while
in terms of the measurement Eve performs an individual mea-
surement instead of a collective measurement. Among indi-
vidual attacks, Gaussian attacks are also known to be optimal
for the Gaussian CV-QKD protocols.
For the security analysis against Gaussian individual at-
tacks we can also consider an optimal Gaussian individual
attack with parameters ηf and ξf . In this attack Eve inter-
acts individually with each signal sent from Alice to Bob with
the effective parameters ηf and ξf
3, with an individual mea-
surement on her output ancillary state as soon as she obtains
it. Note that in the no-switching CV-QKD protocol Eve does
not need a quantum memory to perform the individual mea-
surement, since there is no basis information withheld in this
protocol. This individual attack is also i.i.d over all sub-
channels, which means the conditional smooth min-entropy
can be lower bounded by the conditional von Neumann en-
tropy. Thus the total finite-size key rate with the security pa-
rameter ǫ against Gaussian individual attacks can also be given
by Eq. (8), where χǫPE(b:E) must be replaced by IǫPE(b:E).
Note that IǫPE(b:E) has to be calculated based on the effective
parameters of the channel, i.e., ηf and ξf .
B. Security analysis for each sub-channel separately
For the security analysis against collective attacks with the
security parameter ǫ (ǫ=2ǫsm+ǫ¯+ǫPE+ǫcor) one could also
write Hǫsmmin(b |E)=
∑
i piH
ǫsm,i
min,i(b |E), where Hǫsm,imin,i(b |E)
is the conditional smooth min-entropy for a sub-channel
with parameters ηi and ξηi occurring with probability pi,
and ǫsm,i = piǫsm. By considering an optimal Gaussian
collective attack with parameters ηi and ξηi over the sub-
channel, one can lower bound Hǫsm,imin,i(b |E) by the condi-
tional von Neumann entropy since the attack is i.i.d over
the sub-channel (note that this attack is not i.i.d over all
sub-channels). More explicitly, one can analyse the se-
curity for each sub-channel separately, i.e., calculate the
composable finite-size key length for each sub-channel with
the security parameter ǫi (where ǫi = piǫ) as ℓi =
N ′s[βIi(a:b)−χǫPE,ii (b:E)]−
√
N ′s∆AEP−2 log2( 12ǫ¯i ) (where
N ′s = piN
′, and where Ii(a:b) is the classical mutual in-
formation between Alice and Bob for the sub-channel, and
χǫPE,ii (b:E) is Eve’s information from collective attack over
the sub-channel, which is calculated based on the covariance
matrix MAB1,η with parameter ǫPE,i = piǫPE), and then av-
erage over all sub-channels to obtain the total finite-size key
rate with the security parameter ǫ as 1N
∑
i ℓi. Note that in a
realistic finite-size regime this approach might result in pes-
simistic key rates. This is due to the fact that in practice
only a small number of signal states can be transmitted over
3 Note that different schemes have been proposed for a Gaussian interaction
in an optimal individual attack against the no-switching CV-QKD protocol,
with the entangling cloner is one of them [60, 61].
each sub-channel, which results in a very pessimistic finite
key length for each sub-channel, i.e., ℓi, since Eve’s informa-
tion, χǫPE,ii (b:E), which is estimated based on a small num-
ber of signals ks (where ks = pik), might be overestimated
(when the block size is reduced, the error bar on the estimators
of channel parameters increases, which results in estimating
higher information for Eve). Note that this type of security
analysis can also be used against individual attacks, however
as discussed earlier the resulting key rate is expected to be
pessimistic.
Note that in practice, it would be more practical to esti-
mate the average SNR of the free-space channel based on the
whole revealed data, and then choose an error-correction code
rate based on this average SNR for the error correction of the
whole remaining data. This means the mutual information
should be calculated theoretically based on the effective pa-
rameters of the channel, i.e., ηf and ξf . Alternatively and
also ideally, it could be possible to estimate the SNR for each
sub-channel separately, and then choose an error-correction
code rate based on the sub-channel SNR for the error correc-
tion of the sub-channel data, which means the mutual infor-
mation should be calculated theoretically by averaging over
the mutual information obtained from each sub-channel as∑
i piIi(a:b). However, estimation of SNR for each sub-
channel based on a small number of signals revealed for each
sub-channel does not give a good estimation of SNR. Note
that in our numerical simulations we calculate the mutual in-
formation based on the effective parameters ηf and ξf , which
is a lower bound on
∑
i piIi(a:b).
C. Parameter estimation for free-space CV-QKD systems
Alice and Bob are able to estimate the channel transmis-
sivity and check its stability during the transmission of data
[33, 62]. This is experimentally feasible, as the typical rate of
free-space channel fluctuations is of the order of KHz, while
the modulation and detection rate is typically of the order of
several MHz, i.e., at least thousands of signal states can be
transmitted during the stability time of the free-space channel
[27]. The proper sub-channel estimation requires a large num-
ber of states to be sent through the channel during its stability.
Then, some of the states for each sub-channel occurrence are
randomly chosen for the parameter estimation.
For instance, let us consider the free-space channel fluctu-
ation rate of 1 KHz. Then, we can assume that within each
millisecond the channel is relatively stable and can be mod-
elled with a fixed-transmissivity sub-channel of transmissiv-
ity η. Let us also consider the transmission and detection rate
of 100 MHz. Hence, Ns = 10
5 signal states can be trans-
mitted and detected at the receiver during the stability time
of the channel. A fraction of these signals (ks = cNs) can
be randomly chosen to reveal for parameter estimation, with
the remaining data contributing to the secret key. Finally, for
instance, for 100 seconds of data transmission we will have
transmitted N = 1010 signal states (with 105 signal states
being transmitted during each stability time of the channel),
with a fraction of which, k = cN , revealed over all sub-
6channels for the parameter estimation. Then, a number of
N ′ = N − k = (1− c)N signals will contribute to the shared
secret key. Note that the security is not analysed for each sub-
channel occurrence separately as it results in pessimistic key
rates (see Sec. IVB), instead the security is shown for the
ensemble-average state, being obtained from the set of data
of size N − k upon all sub-channels.
Since in our security analysis it is sufficient to consider
an optimal Gaussian attack with parameters ηf and ξf , we
can generalize the parameter estimation method introduced
for a fixed-transmissivity quantum channel in [63, 64] to esti-
mate the covariance matrix of the ensemble-average state us-
ing the data of size k revealed over all sub-channels. For a
no-switching CV-QKD protocol with Bob’s heterodyne detec-
tor efficiency ηB and electronic noise νB , for a channel with
fluctuating transmissivity η, we can consider a normal linear
model for Alice and Bob’s correlated variables, xA and xB ,
respectively.
xB = txA + xn, (9)
where t =
√
ηB
2 〈
√
η〉 =
√
ηBηf
2 , and xn follows a cen-
tred normal distribution with unknown variance σ2 = 1 +
νB +
ηB
2 (〈ηξη〉 + Var(
√
η)VA) = 1 + νB +
ηB
2 ηfξf (note
that Alice’s variable xA has the variance VA). Using the to-
tal revealed data of size k, we can calculate the maximum-
likelihood estimators for t and σ2, which are given by
tˆ =
∑k
i=1 AiBi∑k
i=1 Ai
2 ,
σˆ2 = 1k
∑k
i=1 (Bi − tˆAi)
2
,
(10)
where Ai and Bi are the realizations of xA and xB , respec-
tively. The confidence intervals for these parameters are given
by t ∈ [tˆ−∆(t), tˆ+∆(t)], and σ2 ∈ [σˆ2−∆(σ2), σˆ2+∆(σ2)]
where
∆(t) = zǫPE/2
√
σˆ2∑k
i=1 Ai
2 ,
∆(σ2) = zǫPE/2
σˆ2
√
2√
k
.
(11)
Note that when no signal is exchanged, Bob’s variable with
realization B0i follows a centred normal distribution with un-
known variance σ20 = 1+ νB , which is Bob’s shot noise vari-
ance. The maximum-likelihood estimator for σ20 is given by
σˆ20 =
1
N
∑N
i=1 B0i. The confidence intervals for this param-
eters is given by σ20 ∈ [σˆ20 − ∆(σ20), σˆ20 + ∆(σ20)], where
∆(σ20) = zǫPE/2
σˆ20
√
2√
N
4. Now we can estimate the effective
4 Note that zǫPE/2 is such that 1− erf(
zǫPE/2√
2
)/2 = ǫPE/2.
parameters ηf and ξf , which are given by
ηˆf =
2tˆ2
ηˆB
,
∆(ηf ) = ηˆf
(∣∣∣ 2∆(t)
tˆ
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∆(ηB)ηˆB
∣∣∣) ,
ξˆf = 2
σˆ2−σˆ20
ηˆf ηˆB
,
∆(ξf ) = ξˆf
(∣∣∣ ∆(σ2)σˆ2−σˆ20
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ ∆(σ20)σˆ2−σˆ20
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∆(ηB)ηˆB
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∆(ηf )ηˆf
∣∣∣),
(12)
where ηˆB is the estimator of Bob’s detector efficiency with
uncertainty ∆(ηB). Note that in order to maximise Eve’s in-
formation from collective and individual attacks, the worst-
case estimators of the effective parameters ηf and ξf should
be used to evaluate Eve’s information.
Note that for the sub-channel post-selection which we dis-
cuss in the next section, Alice and Bob also need to estimate
the transmissivity of each sub-channel separately. We can use
the similar method as discussed above to estimate the sub-
channel transmissivity. Considering a normal linear model
xB = tsxA + xn,s for a sub-channel with transmissivity η,
the maximum-likelihood estimators for the sub-channel pa-
rameters, ts and σ
2
s (i.e., the variance of xn,s), are given by
[63, 64]
tˆs =
∑ks
i=1 AiBi∑ks
i=1 Ai
2
,
σˆ2s =
1
ks
∑ks
i=1 (Bi − tˆsAi)
2
,
(13)
whereAi andBi are the realizations of xA and xB for the sub-
channel, respectively, and ks is the number of signals revealed
for the sub-channel. The error bar for these parameters are
given by
∆(ts) = zǫPE/2
√
σˆ2s∑ks
i=1 Ai
2
,
∆(σ2s ) = zǫPE/2
σˆ2s
√
2√
ks
.
(14)
The worst-case estimator of the sub-channel transmissivity η
is then given by
ηmin = ηˆ −∆(η),where
ηˆ =
2tˆ2s
ηˆB
,
∆(η) = ηˆ
(∣∣∣2∆(ts)
tˆs
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∆(ηB)ηˆB
∣∣∣) ,
(15)
Note that Alice and Bob have to perform their post-selection
based on ηmin = ηˆ −∆(η).
V. CLASSICAL POST-PROCESSING STRATEGIES TO
IMPROVE FREE-SPACE CV-QKD SYSTEMS
If we compare a fluctuating channel with an equivalent
fixed-transmissivity channel with transmissivity ηf = 〈√η〉2
7and excess-noise 〈ηξη〉, the fluctuating channel has an extra
non-Gaussian noise of Var(
√
η)(V − 1) (see Eq. (7)), which
reduces the key rate. Although fluctuating transmissivity of a
free-space channel reduces the key rate, it also provides the
possibility to improve or even recover it through the post-
selection of sub-channels with high transmissivity [27] or the
clusterisation of sub-channels [33].
In the post-selection technique as introduced in [27], the
data collected for each sub-channel is kept, conditioned on the
estimated sub-channel transmissivity being larger than a post-
selection threshold ηth, and discarded otherwise. In this tech-
nique, the security should be analysed over the post-selected
data. With such a post-selection, the post-selected data be-
comes more Gaussian and more strongly correlated, since the
post-selection reduces the fluctuation variance of the channel,
while increases the average transmissivity of the channel.
In the clusterisation technique as introduced in [33], for the
classical post-processing, Alice and Bob partition their data
into n different clusters, and perform classical post-processing
(including reconciliation and privacy amplification) over each
cluster separately. The clusterization we consider here is such
that the jth cluster (j = 1, 2, ..., n) corresponds to the jth
channel transmissivity bin (j−1)δ < η < jδ, with the bin size
δ = ηmaxn . Note that the clusterisation we consider here is the
uniform binning of the probability distribution, however, in
principle the width of each cluster can be optimised depending
on the probability distribution. With such a technique, the
clusterised data becomes more Gaussian, since the fluctuation
variance of the channel is reduced within each cluster.
The post-selection has been shown to improve the free-
space CV-QKD performance in terms of the key rate in
the asymptotic regime against Gaussian collective attacks
[27, 30], and the clusterisation has been shown to improve
the key rate in the finite-size regime against Gaussian collec-
tive attacks [27, 30], but not in a composable-security regime.
However, both post-selection and clusterisation reduces the
size of the data used for the security analysis and the size of
the data used for the parameter estimation. Hence, the com-
posable finite-size effects become more significant in these
scenarios. In the following sections we investigate the effec-
tiveness of the post-selection and clusterisation in the compos-
able finite-size regime against both individual and collective
attacks (where the security against general attacks can be ob-
tained by the security against collective attacks with a larger
security parameter).
A. Composable finite-size security analysis for the
post-selection
In the finite-size regime, the size of the post-selected data
is Nps = PsN , where Ps is the post-selection success proba-
bility, i.e., the total probability for the channel transmissivity
to fall within the post-selected region, η ≥ ηth, and is given
by Ps =
∫ ηmax
ηth
p(η)dη. Note that since in the post-selection
protocol Eve’s information should be estimated based on the
post-selected data, Alice and Bob can only use the revealed
data over the post-selected sub-channels to estimate the co-
variance matrix of the post-selected ensemble-average state,
which means a data of size kps = Psk is used for the param-
eter estimation. Recall that k is the amount of revealed data
over all sub-channels. Hence, the data of sizeN ′ps = Nps−kps
contributes to the post-selected key. Explicitly, the finite-size
key length of the post-selection protocol which is ǫ-secure
against Gaussian collective attacks in the reverse reconcilia-
tion scenario is given by
ℓcolps ≤ N ′ps[βIps(a:b)−χǫPEps (b:E)]−
√
N ′ps∆AEP−2 log2( 12ǫ¯ ).
(16)
Eve’s information from Gaussian collective attack in the post-
selection protocol, is calculated based on the covariance ma-
trix of the post-selected ensemble-average state ρpsAB1 , which
is given by
M
ps
AB1
=

 V I
√
ηpsf
√
V 2 − 1Z√
ηpsf
√
V 2 − 1Z
[
ηpsf (V−1)+ηpsf ξpsf +1
]
I

 ,
ηpsf =
〈√
η
〉2
ps
,
ηpsf ξ
ps
f = Varps(
√
η)(V − 1) + 〈ηξη〉ps,
Varps(
√
η) = 〈η〉ps −
〈√
η
〉2
ps
.
(17)
where the symbol 〈.〉ps denotes the mean value over the post-
selected sub-channels, i.e.,
〈η〉ps = 1Ps
∫ ηmax
ηth
ηp(η)dη,
〈√
η
〉
ps
= 1Ps
∫ ηmax
ηth
√
ηp(η)dη,
〈ηξη〉ps = 1Ps
∫ ηmax
ηth
ηξηp(η)dη.
(18)
Similarly, the finite-size key length of the post-selection pro-
tocol which is ǫ-secure against Gaussian individual attacks in
the reverse reconciliation scenario is given by
ℓindps ≤ N ′ps[βIps(a:b)−IǫPEps (b:E)]−
√
N ′ps∆AEP−2 log2( 12ǫ¯),
(19)
where Eve’s information from Gaussian individual attack in
the post-selection protocol has to also be calculated based on
the effective parameters ηpsf and ξ
ps
f . Note that Eve’s infor-
mation χǫPEps (b:E) and I
ǫPE
ps (b:E) should be calculated based
on the worst-case estimators of the effective parameters ηpsf
and ξpsf , where the estimations in Eqs. (10) to (12) have to be
calculated based on the revealed data over the post-selected
sub-channels of size kps. Note also that the classical mutual
information between Alice and Bob obtained from the post-
selection, Ips(a:b), is calculated based on the effective pa-
rameters ηpsf and ξ
ps
f , and ∆AEP is calculated using Eq. (2)
with N ′ being replaced by N ′ps. Finally, the finite-size key
rate of the post-selection protocol is given by ℓps/N . See Ap-
pendix A for the detailed calculation of Eve’s information and
Alice and Bob’s mutual information.
Note that the post-selection of high-transmissivity sub-
channels has two different effects on the finite-size key rate.
In fact, on the positive side the post-selection makes the
8ensemble-average state more Gaussian and more strongly cor-
related, while on the negative side the post-selection reduces
the block size, and also makes the error bars larger in the pa-
rameter estimation.
As discussed earlier in Sec. IVC, Alice and Bob can es-
timate the transmissivity of each sub-channel by revealing a
fraction of the data allocated to each sub-channel. In the post-
selection protocol, based on such an estimation of sub-channel
transmissivity, they decide to keep or discard the sub-channel
data. Note that the sub-channel transmissivity can be esti-
mated using different schemes, e.g., by transmitting auxiliary
coherent (classical) light probe signals that are intertwined
with the quantum information [39, 40], or by monitoring the
local oscillator at the receiver, where the signal and the local
oscillator have been sent in two orthogonally polarized modes
through the free-space channel [41]. However, in all these
scenarios it would be very likely for Eve to manipulate the
classical probe signal or the local oscillator in such a way to
gain an advantage, for instance, forcingAlice and Bob to post-
select a particular sub-channel, which is not actually within
the post-selection region, can result in underestimating Eve’s
information by Alice and Bob.
Fig. 1 shows the post-selected key rate in both the asymp-
totic and composable finite-size regime as a function of the
post-selection threshold ηth, where the security is analysed
against both collective and individual attacks. As can be seen
for both asymptotic and finite-size regime, the key rate result-
ing from both collective and individual attacks first improves
up to an optimized value, as the threshold value increases,
and then the key rate decreases. As the threshold value in-
creases, the variance of the channel fluctuations,Var(
√
η) de-
creases, while the effective efficiency, 〈√η〉 increases. As a
result, the post-selected state becomes more Gaussian (i.e.,
with less non-Gaussian noise) and more strongly correlated,
which increases the mutual information between Alice and
Bob. However, this increase in the mutual information hap-
pens at the cost of lower success probability, Ps, and larger
error bars for the estimated parameters. Hence, there is an op-
timal threshold value which maximizes the post-selected key
rate. As can be seen, from left to right, the post-selection be-
comes more effective. In fact, this type of post-selection is
more useful for recovering the key rate in cases where it was
strongly diminished by the free-space channel. Fig. 1 also
shows the significant improvement of the finite-size key rate
from collective attacks due to the post-selection compared to
the asymptotic regime. While without the post-selection, pos-
itive finite key rates cannot be generated against collective at-
tacks for 〈η〉 = 0.08, by performing the post-selection beyond
ηth = 0.05, Alice and Bob are able to move from an insecure
regime to a secure regime, and generate non-trivial positive
finite key rates.
B. Composable finite-size security analysis for the
clusterisation
For the clusterisation technique, in order to compute the
key rate with security parameter ǫ (where ǫ = 2ǫsm + ǫ¯ +
ǫPE + ǫcor), the conditional smooth min-entropy H
ǫsm
min(b|E)
can be written as the convex sum of the conditional smooth
min-entropy of n different clusters of data, i.e.,Hǫsmmin(b|E) =∑n
j=1 Pj H
ǫsm,j
min,j(b|E), with Pj =
∫ jηmax
n
(j−1)ηmax
n
p(η)dη is the
probability for the channel transmissivity to fall within the jth
cluster, and ǫsm,j = Pjǫsm. Note that for each cluster Eve’s
attack can be considered as an i.i.d Gaussian attack with ef-
fective parameters ηjf and ξ
j
f , given by
ηjf =
〈√
η
〉2
j
,
ηjfξ
j
f = Varj(
√
η)(V − 1) + 〈ηξη〉j ,
Varj(
√
η) = 〈η〉j −
〈√
η
〉2
j
,
(20)
where the symbol 〈.〉j denotes the mean value over all sub-
channels within the jth cluster, i.e.,
〈η〉j = 1Pj
∫ jηmax
n
(j−1)ηmax
n
ηp(η)dη,
〈√
η
〉
j
= 1Pj
∫ jηmax
n
(j−1)ηmax
n
√
ηp(η)dη,
〈ηξη〉j = 1Pj
∫ jηmax
n
(j−1)ηmax
n
ηξηp(η)dη.
(21)
Since the attack can be considered i.i.d over each cluster,
we can lower bound Hǫsm,jmin,j(b|E) with the conditional
von Neumann entropy and compute the key length with
security parameter ǫj = Pjǫ for the jth cluster as ℓ
col
j =
PjN
′[βIj(a:b)−χǫPE,jj (b:E)]−
√
PjN ′∆AEP−2 log2( 12ǫ¯j )
against collective attacks, and ℓindj =
PjN
′[βIj(a:b)−IǫPE,jj (b:E)]−
√
PjN ′∆AEP−2 log2( 12ǫ¯j )
against individual attacks, where Ij(a:b) is the classical
mutual information between Alice and Bob for the jth cluster
calculated based on the effective parameters ηjf and ξ
j
f , and
χǫPE,jj (b:E) is Eve’s information from collective attack over
the jth cluster, which is calculated based on the covariance
matrixM
j
AB1
M
j
AB1
=

 V I
√
ηjf
√
V 2 − 1Z√
ηjf
√
V 2 − 1Z
[
ηjf (V−1)+ηjf ξjf+1
]
I

 ,
(22)
and IǫPE,jj (b:E) is Eve’s information from individual attack
over the jth cluster, which is calculated based on the ef-
fective parameters ηjf and ξ
j
f . Note that Eve’s information,
χǫPE,jj (b:E) and I
ǫPE,j
j (b:E), is now estimated based on the
worst-case estimators of the effective parameters ηjf and ξ
j
f ,
where the estimations in Eqs. (10) to (12) have to be calcu-
lated based on the revealed data over cluster j of size Pjk,
with the maximum failure probability ǫPE,j = PjǫPE. Note
also that ∆AEP is calculated using Eq. (2) with N
′ being re-
placed by PjN
′, and ∆AEP is now calculated based on the
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FIG. 1. Post-selected key rate in the asymptotic (dashed lines) and composable finite-size (solid lines) regime as a function of the post-selection
threshhold ηth, secure against collective (red lines) and individual (blue lines) attacks. The numerical values for the finite-size regime are the
securiy parameter ǫ = 10−9, with the parameter estimation being analysed for ǫPE = 10
−10, and the discretization parameter d = 5. The
other parameters are chosen from the most recent CV-QKD experiment [17] as follows. Bob’s detector has efficieny ηB = 0.6, and electronic
noise νB = 0.25. The reconciliation efficiency is considered to be β = 0.98. The expected excess noise of each sub-channel is assumed
to be fixed as ξ = 0.01 a. The block size is chosen to be N = 1010, half of which is used in total for parameter estimation. Since the
non-Gaussian noise (i.e., the term Var(
√
η)(V− 1) in Eq. (7)) depends on the modulation variance, the modulation variance is optimized for
each post-selection threshold to maximise the key rate secure against collective and individual attacks. We consider a probability distribution
for the free-space channel given by the elliptic-beam model (see Appendix B for more details on the model). From left to right we have the
average 〈η〉 = 0.54, 0.32, 0.12, 0.08, 〈√η〉 = 0.73, 0.56, 0.34, 0.27, the variance Var(√η) = 0.003, 0.005, 0.003, 0.002, and the maximum
transmissivity ηmax = 0.68, 0.46, 0.20, 0.13 (see Fig. 3 in Appendix for the corresponding probability distributions p(η)).
a Note that although in our numerical simulations we have assumed a fixed excess noise for each sub-channel, our parameter estimation presented in Sec. IVC
also works for the case of fluctuating excess noise
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FIG. 2. Key rate in the asymptotic (dotted lines) and composable finite-size (solid lines) regime as a function of the number of clusters n, secure
against collective (red lines) and individual (blue lines) attacks. The numerical values are the same as Fig. 1. From left to right we have the
average 〈η〉 = 0.12, 0.08, 〈√η〉 = 0.34, 0.27, the variance Var(√η) = 0.003, 0.002, and the maximum transmissivity ηmax = 0.20, 0.13.
parameters ǫj , ǫsm,j , and ǫ¯j = Pjǫ. The total key rate with
security parameter ǫ is then given by 1N
∑n
j=1 ℓj .
Fig. 2 shows the key rate in both the asymptotic and com-
posable finite-size regime secure against collective/individual
attacks as a function of the number of clusters n. Note that
n = 1 indicates no clusterization, where security is anal-
ysed over all data. As can be seen clusterization always in-
creases the asymptotic key rate against collective/individual
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attacks. However, by considering composable finite-size ef-
fects in the security analysis, there is an optimal number of
clusters which maximises the key rate. In fact, as the num-
ber of clusters increases, the variance of channel fluctuation
within each cluster decreases. As a result, the non-Gaussian
noise becomes smaller for each cluster, which makes the state
obtained over each cluster more Gaussian. However, as the
number of clusters increases, the number of signals for each
cluster decreases. As a result, the composable finite-size ef-
fects (i.e., the effect of ∆-term, and the effect of parameter
estimation which is now performed based on Pjk signals with
ǫPE,j) become more significant, which reduces the key rate.
Fig. 2 shows that while for 〈η〉 = 0.08, without clusteriza-
tion (i.e., n = 1) the protocol is not secure against collec-
tive attacks in the composable finite-size regime, if Alice and
Bob perform clusterisation as described above, the protocol
becomes secure against collective attacks and finite key rate
is maximised for n = 2. Note that when the number of clus-
ters, n, becomes sufficiently large, the security analysis is per-
formed as if the security is analysed over each sub-channel
separately (as described in Sec. IVB).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have analysed the security of the no-switching CV-
QKD protocol over free-space channels with fluctuating trans-
missivity in the composable finite-size regime against both
collective and individual attacks. We introduced a parameter
estimation approach, where Alice and Bob can efficiently esti-
mate the effective parameters (i.e., the effective transmissivity
and excess noise) of an optimal Gaussian attack using the data
revealed over all sub-channels used for the security analysis.
We analysed two classical post-processing strategies, the post-
selection of high-transmissivity sub-channels and partitioning
sub-channels into different clusters, in the composable finite-
size regime, showing that these strategies can improve the
finite-size key rate against both individual and collective at-
tacks. Most remarkable improvement is for the finite-size col-
lective attacks, which are the most practically relevant, where
we see these classical post-processing allows significant key
rates in situations that would otherwise be completely inse-
cure.
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Appendix A: Key rate calculation
1. Eve’s information from collective attack
At the output of the channel Bob applies heterodyne de-
tection to mode B1. Bob’s heterodyne detector with effi-
ciency ηB and electronic noise variance of νB can be mod-
eled by placing a beam splitter of transmissivity ηB before
an ideal heterodyne detector [66, 67]. The heterodyne de-
tector’s electronic noise can be modelled by a two-mode
squeezed vacuum state, ρF0G, of quadrature variance υ, where
υ = 1+ 2νB/(1− ηB). One input port of the beam splitter is
the received modeB1, and the second input port is fed by one
half of the entangled state ρF0G, mode F0, while the output
ports are mode B2 (which is measured by the ideal hetero-
dyne detector) and mode F .
In a collective attack, Eve’s information, χ(b:E), is given
by χ(b:E) = S(ρE)− S(ρE|B), where S(ρ) is the von Neu-
mann entropy of the state ρ. Here we assume Bob’s detec-
tion noise is not accessible to Eve. In this case S(ρE) =
S(ρAB1), where the entropy S(ρAB1 ) can be calculated
through the symplectic eigenvalues ν1,2 of covariance ma-
trix MAB1
5 in Eq. (7). The second entropy we require in
order to determine χ(b:E) can be written as S(ρE|B) =
S(ρE|B2) = S(ρAFG|B2). The covariance matrix of the con-
ditional state ρAFG|B2 is given by MAFG|B2 = MAFG −
σAFG,B2 Hhet σ
T
AFG,B2
, whereHhet = (MB2 + I)
−1, and
whereMB2 = VB2I, where
VB2 = ηB [ηf (V − 1) + ηfξf + 1] + (1− ηB)υ. (A1)
Note that the matrices MAFG,σAFG,B2 , and MB2 can be
derived from the decomposition of the covariance matrix
MAFGB2 =
[
MAFG σAFG,B2
σ
T
AFG,B2
MB2
]
. (A2)
Note that the covariance matrix MAFGB2 is given
by MAFGB2 = (1A ⊕ Sbs ⊕ 1G)T [MAB1 ⊕
MF0G](1A ⊕ Sbs ⊕ 1G), where Sbs is the matrix for
the beam splitter transformation (applied on modes B1 and
F0), given by
Sbs =
[ √
ηB I
√
1− ηB I
−√1− ηB I √ηB I
]
, (A3)
and the covariance matrix of the entangled state ρF0G is given
by
MF0G =
[
υ I
√
υ2 − 1Z√
υ2 − 1Z υ I
]
. (A4)
Note that in the finite-size regime, χǫPE(b:E) should be cal-
culated based on the worst-case estimators of ηf and ξf . Note
5 The von Neumann entropy of an n-mode Gaussian state ρ with the co-
variance matrix M is given by S(ρ) =
∑n
i=1G(
νi−1
2
), where νi are
the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix M, and G(x) =
(x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2(x).
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also that for the post-selection protocol, the parameters ηf and
ξf have to be replaced by the post-selection parameters η
ps
f
and ξpsf from Eq. (17), and for the clusterisation, the param-
eters ηf and ξf have to be replaced by the cluster parameters
ηjf and ξ
j
f from Eq. (20).
2. Eve’s information from individual attack
Considering a free-space channel with effective parameters
ηf and ξf , defined in Eq. (7), in the individual attack, Eve’s
information, I(b:E), is given by I(b:E) = log2
V
Bhet
2
V
B2
het|E
[60, 61], where VBhet2 is the variance of heterodyne-detected
mode B2 for the post-selected sub-channel, and is given by
VBhet2 = (VB2 + 1)/2, where VB2 is given in Eq. (A1). Note
that VBhet2 |E in the case of Bob’s detection noise not being ac-
cessible to Eve is given by VB2het|E = ηB[
V xE+1
V+xE
+ χhet]/2,
where xE = ηf (2− ξf )2/(
√
2− 2ηf + ηfξf +
√
ξf ))
2 +1,
and χhet = [1 + (1 − ηB) + 2νB]/ηB . Note that in the
finite-size regime, IǫPE(b:E) should be calculated based on
the worst-case estimators of ηf and ξf . Note also that the
parameters ηf and ξf have to be replaced by parameters η
ps
f
and ξpsf from Eq. (17) for the post-selection protocol, and by
parameters ηjf and ξ
j
f from Eq. (20) for cluster j.
3. Mutual information between Alice and Bob
The classical mutual information between Alice and Bob
is given by I(a:b) = log2
V
Bhet
2
V
B2
het|Ahet
. The conditional vari-
ance VB2het|Ahet is the variance of heterodyne-detected mode
B2 conditioned on Alice’s heterodyne detection of mode A,
which is given by VB2het|Ahet=ηBηf (1 + χtot)/2, where
χtot = χline +
χhet
ηf
, with χline = ξf − 1 + 1ηf . Note that
for the post-selected protocol, the parameters ηf and ξf have
to be replaced by the post-selection parameters ηpsf and ξ
ps
f ,
and for the clusterisation, the parameters ηf and ξf have to be
replaced by the cluster parameters ηjf and ξ
j
f .
Appendix B: Elliptic-beam model
We have considered a free-space channel, where the prob-
ability distribution for the channel transmissivity is given by
the elliptic-beam model [24]. This model can be used for an
atmospheric channel including beam wandering, beam broad-
ening and beam shape deformation [24]. However, for this
model, referred to as the elliptic beam approximation, there
is not an explicit form for the probability distribution. Here,
we briefly discuss how to apply the model of the elliptic-beam
approximation for calculation of the key rate. Further details
on the model can be found in [24]. Within this model, it is as-
sumed that turbulent disturbances along the propagation path
result in beam wandering and deformation of the Gaussian
beam profile into an elliptical form. The elliptic beam at the
aperture plane is characterized by the beam-centroid position
r0 = (x0, y0)
T = (r0 cosψ0, r0 sinψ0)
T , andW1 andW2 as
semi-axes of the elliptic spot, where the semi-axisW1 has an
angleψ ∈ [0, π/2) relative to the x axis. Defining φ = ψ−ψ0,
the aperture transmissivity ηa is a function of real parameters
[x0, y0,Θ1,Θ2, φ] [25], which are randomly changed by the
atmosphere. Note that Θ1 and Θ2 are related to the semi-
axes, as W 2j = W
2
0 exp(Θj) [24] for j = 1, 2 with W0 the
initial beam-spot radius. Note also that random fluctuations
of the beam-centroid position r0, i.e. the parameters x0 and
y0 cause the effect of beam wandering. For the parameters
[x0, y0,Θ1,Θ2], we can assume a four-dimensional Gaussian
distribution, and for the parameter φ, by assuming isotropic
turbulence, we can assume a uniform distribution in the in-
terval [0, π/2] [25]. Under the assumption of isotropic turbu-
lence, there is no correlation between φ with other linear pa-
rameters [24]. We also assume that 〈r0〉 = 0, i.e., beam wan-
dering fluctuations are placed around the reference-frame ori-
gin. Under this assumption, correlations between x0, y0 and
Θj vanish [24]. Hence, we first generate n independent Gaus-
sian random vectors vi = (x0i, y0i,Θ1i,Θ2i), i = 1, ..., n
and n random uniformly-distributed anglesφi ∈ [0, π/2]. The
Gaussian random parameters (x0i, y0i,Θ1i,Θ2i) can be char-
acterized by the covariance matrix,
M =


〈
∆x20
〉
0 0 0
0
〈
∆y20
〉
0 0
0 0
〈
∆Θ21
〉 〈∆Θ1∆Θ2〉
0 0 〈∆Θ1∆Θ2〉
〈
∆Θ22
〉


(B1)
and the mean value (0, 0, 〈Θ1〉 , 〈Θ2〉). The elements of the
covariance matrix and the mean values for weak turbulence
are given by [24]
〈
∆x20
〉
=
〈
∆y20
〉
= 0.33W 20σ
2
RΩ
− 70 ,
〈
∆Θ21
〉
= ln
[
1 +
1.2σ2RΩ
5
6(
1+2.96σ2RΩ
5
6
)2
]
,
〈∆Θ1∆Θ2〉 = ln
[
1− 0.8σ2RΩ
5
6(
1+2.96σ2RΩ
5
6
)2
]
,
〈Θ1〉 = 〈Θ2〉 = ln

 (1+2.96σ2RΩ 56 )2
Ω2
√(
1+2.96σ2RΩ
5
6
)2
+1.2σ2RΩ
5
6

 ,
(B2)
where σ2R is the Rytov parameter, Ω =
kW 20
2L is the Fres-
nel parameter, k is the wave number and L is the propa-
gation distance. After generating n random vectors vi =
(x0i, y0i,Θ1i,Θ2i), and n random angles φi ∈ [0, π/2), we
can generate n random transmissivity ηa,i = ηa(vi, φi) as
12
[24]
ηa(vi, φi) = η0 exp

−

 r0/a
R
(
2
Weff (φ)
)


λ
(
2
Weff (φ)
)
 ,
(B3)
where r0 =
√
x20 + y
2
0 , is the distance between the beam and
the aperture center, and a is the radius of the circular receiver
aperture. The transmissivity for the centered beam, i.e., for
r0 = 0 is given by [24]
η0 = 1− I0
(
a2
[
1
W 21
− 1
W 22
])
exp
{
−a2
[
1
W 21
+ 1
W 22
]}
−2
[
1− exp
{
−a22
[
1
W1
− 1W2
]2}]
× exp

−
[
(W1+W2)
2
|W21−W22 |
R
(
1
W1
− 1W2
)
]λ( 1W1 − 1W2 )
 .
(B4)
The further parameters, including effective squared spot ra-
dius, W 2eff(φ), the scale R(ζ) and shape λ(ζ) functions are
given by are given by [24]
W 2eff(φ) = 4a
2×
[
W
(
4a2
W1W2
exp
{
a2
W 21
(1+2cos2φ)
}
exp
{
a2
W 22
(1+2sin2φ)
})]−1
,
R(ζ) =
(
ln
[
2
1−exp{− 12a2ζ2}
1−exp{−a2ζ2}I0(a2ζ2)
])− 1
λ(ζ)
,
λ(ζ) = 2a2ζ2
exp{−a2ζ2}I1(a2ζ2)
1−exp{−a2ζ2}I0(a2ζ2)
×
(
ln
[
2
1−exp{− 12a2ζ2}
1−exp{−a2ζ2}I0(a2ζ2)
])−1
,
(B5)
whereW(ζ) is the LambertW function, and Ij(ζ) is the mod-
ified Bessel function of the jth order.
We also consider a deterministic (constant) tranmissivity
ηm ∈ [0, 1], which means the total transmissivity of the chan-
nel would be ηi = ηmηa,i. Note that ηm can be considered
as the extinction factor of the atmospheric channel describing
the absorption and scattering losses [25]. Based on the gen-
erated sampling data, one can estimate the mean value of any
function of the transmissivity f(η) as 〈f(η)〉 = 1n
n∑
i=1
f(ηi).
For instance, Eq. (6) can be modified as
〈η〉 = 1n
n∑
i=1
ηi,
〈√
η
〉
= 1n
n∑
i=1
√
ηi,
〈ηξη〉 = 1n
n∑
i=1
ηiξηi .
(B6)
In our numerical analysis we have first fitted a probability dis-
tribution to the generated sampled data ηi (shown in Fig. 3),
which gives us a numerical form for p(ηi). Note that since
no closed-form solution for p(η) could be used, the integrals
required to be computed for the security analysis (provided in
Eqs. (18) and (21)) should be numerically evaluated.
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FIG. 3. The probability distribution function p(η) obtained for the generated sampled data ηi, n = 10
4. For the sample generations the param-
eters are chosen based on an experimentally implemented free-space experiment [27]. The elliptic-beam model [24] shows good agreement
with the experimental distribution of the transmissivity [24]. The following parameter values are used, the wavelength λ = 809 nm, the initial
beam-spot radiusW0 = 20 mm, deterministic attenuation 1.25 dB, and the radius of the receiver aperture a = 40 mm. The Rytov parameter
is given by σ2R = 1.23C
2
nk
7/6L11/6, where we choose C2n = 1.5 × 10−14 m−2/3, and the propagation distance L = 1.5, 2, 3, 3.5 km from
left to right.
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